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I. INTRODUCTION 
The recent surge in piracy cases off of the coast of Somalia1 has re-
sulted in the need for effective new approaches to prosecuting pirates. So-
mali courts have attempted to prosecute these cases,2 but have largely failed 
to stop this growing phenomenon.3 The growth in piracy has not only in-
  
  Sandra L. Hodgkinson is a career member of the Senior Executive Service in the U.S. 
Government, and currently serves as Distinguished Visiting Research Fellow at National 
Defense University. The views expressed are her own and do not necessarily represent those 
of National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or of any other government 
entity. 
 1 In 2008 and 2009, pirates attacked roughly 145 vessels; in 2010, the number had in-
creased to 160 vessel attacks, and 53 ships were captured. The potential economic gains of a 
successful pirate attack, $10,000 for the yeoman pirate, which is more money than he could 
earn in five years in Somalia, and much more for the higher-ups in the piracy organization, 
ensure that the risks of possible prosecution are still outweighed by the financial benefit. See 
James Kraska, Coalition Strategy and the Pirates of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, 28 
COMP. STRATEGY 197, 197–99 (2009) (claiming that in 2008, Somali pirates attacked 141 
vessels, and that a single capture was worth up to $10,000 to a low ranking pirate); see also 
Jim Michaels, Pirates’ New Tactics Make Navies’ Job Harder, USA TODAY, Jan. 6, 2011, at 
A6 (claiming 145 attacked ships in 2009 and 160 in 2010). 
 2 See Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on Legal Issues Related to Piracy off the 
Coast of Somalia, Rep. of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. 
S/2011/30 (Jan. 25, 2011) [hereinafter Jack Lang Report] (at the time of the letter, 338 Soma-
lis were detained in Somalia for piracy).  
 3 In the first six months of this year, there were about 177 attacks, including 18 successful 
ones. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Modalities for the Estab-
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creased the current instability in Somalia,4 but has also increased costs at 
ports throughout Africa and undermined fishing and tourism, threatening 
the livelihood of many African states.5 As of June 2011, more than one 
thousand pirates were being held in twenty countries.6 To address this grow-
ing trend, on October 25, 2011, the U.N. Security Council unanimously 
passed a new resolution calling for international cooperation on infor-
mation-sharing for law enforcement and prosecution, and emphasizing the 
need to create specialized anti-piracy courts in Somalia and other courts in 
the region.7  
This article will address some of the efforts to date to successfully 
prosecute piracy cases. States like Kenya and the Seychelles have entered 
into bilateral or multilateral agreements to prosecute pirates in their national 
court systems, with international funding and support, using universal juris-
diction.8 Wealthier, more distant states, such as the U.S.,9 Netherlands,10 and 
  
lishment of Specialized Somali Anti-Piracy Courts, Annex I, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/2011/360 
(June 15, 2011) [hereinafter Rep. of the Secretary-General].  
 4 Background Note: Somalia, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Sept. 26, 2011), http://www.state.gov/r/ 
pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm (discussing how the lack of governance in Somalia has led to instability 
and maritime piracy in the state).  
 5 Victor Erofeyev, Op-Ed., Save the Seychelles From Pirates, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 11, 2011), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/12/opinion/12iht-ederofeyev12.html; U.S. Expresses Con-
cern About Maritime Piracy, NEPTUNE MAR. SECURITY (Feb. 15, 2011), http://www.neptune 
maritimesecurity.posterous.com/us-expresses-concern-about-maritime-piracy (statement of 
U.S. counter-piracy official, Donna L. Hopkins) (“We are very concerned that pirate ransom 
money is actually undermining the development of sustainable legitimate economic activity 
such as fisheries and normal maritime trade.”). 
 6 Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 3, Annex I, ¶ 4 (discussing how prosecution 
of piracy acts has doubled since July 2010); Somalia for Anti-Piracy Court Inside Country, 
DAWN.COM (June 22, 2011), http://www.dawn.com/2011/06/22/somalia-for-anti-piracy-
court-inside-country.html. 
 7 UN Security Council Adopts India-Co-Sponsored Resolution on Piracy, ECON. TIMES 
(Oct. 25, 2011), http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-10-25/news/30320119_ 
1_anti-piracy-piracy-operations-resolution. 
 8 See Memorandum of Understanding Concerning the Conditions of Transfer of Suspect-
ed Pirates and Armed Robbers and Seized Property in the Western Indian Ocean, the Gulf of 
Aden, and the Red Sea, U.S.-Kenya (Jan. 16, 2009) [Memorandum of Understanding U.S.-
Kenya] (on file with author); Memorandum of Understanding on the Conditions of Transfer 
of Suspected Pirates and the Armed Robbers and Seized Property To The Republic of Kenya, 
U.K.-Kenya (Dec. 11, 2008) [hereinafter Memorandum of Understanding U.K.-Kenya] (on 
file with author); Exchange of Letters Between the European Union and the Republic of 
Seychelles on the Conditions and Modalities for the Transfer of Suspected Pirates and 
Armed Robbers from EUNAVFOR to the Republic of Seychelles and for Their Treatment 
After Such Transfer, EU-Seychelles (Aug. 21, 2009) [hereinafter Exchange of Letters] (on 
file with author). 
 9 See, e.g., The United States Response to Piracy off the Coast of Somalia, U.S. DEP’T 
STATE (Nov. 10, 2011), http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/piracy/c32662.htm  (providing infor-
mation on U.S. action in countering piracy through governmental groups international coop-
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Germany,11 have prosecuted pirates in their home territories most often 
when their state’s flagged-vessel has been pirated and/or their citizens taken 
hostage or killed through the act of piracy as a victim state. A separate re-
cent proposal, commissioned by the U.N. Secretary General and authored 
by Jack Lang, the Secretary General’s Special Advisor on legal issues relat-
ed to piracy, now proposes establishing specialized piracy tribunals in So-
malia and Tanzania.12 After assessing the State-led prosecution efforts, this 
article will also examine this new proposal for specialized piracy courts, and 
offer additional recommendations for successful prosecutions. 
II. REGIONAL PROSECUTIONS: KENYA, SEYCHELLES, MAURITIUS, AND 
OTHERS 
There exists sufficient legal authority under international law via 
the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea for nations to exercise criminal 
jurisdiction over pirates captured on the High Seas.13 In addition, a series of 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions have set forth legal authorities for na-
tions to exercise criminal jurisdiction over pirates captured in the territorial 
waters of Somalia.14 Kenya was the first third-country nation to actively 
begin prosecuting pirates picked up by other countries using universal juris-
diction, developing a Memorandum of Agreement with the U.S., and a 
Memorandum of Understanding with the U.K., to take on these responsibili-
ties in late 2008 and early 2009.15 Under these agreements, Kenya would 
  
eration ); United States v. Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, No. 1:09-cr-00512-LAP (S.D.N.Y. 
May 19, 2009) (resulting in a guilty plea for hijacking, kidnapping, and hostage-taking but 
the piracy charges were dropped as part of the plea deal); United States v. Hasan,  747 F. 
Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010) (ruling on numerous pretrial motions in a trial where defend-
ants were charged with piracy and related crimes); United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554 
(E.D. Va. 2010) (dismissing piracy charge for defendants who fired on a U.S. Navy vessel). 
 10 See Spencer Swartz, Somali Pirates Face Trial in Dutch Court, WALL ST. J., May 29, 
2010, at A9. 
 11 See Martin Schlicht, Somalis on Trial in Germany’s First Modern Piracy Case, 
REUTERS (Nov. 22, 2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/22/us-germany-pirates-
idUSTRE6AL2EA20101122. 
 12 Jack Lang Report, supra note 2, at 3. 
 13 See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 105, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNLCOS]. The U.S. is a signatory to the Convention, but the U.S. 
Senate has not yet ratified the Convention. Id. at 397.  
 14 See S.C. Res. 1816, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008) (condemning piracy and 
armed robbery against vessels off the coast of Somalia); S.C. Res. 1846, U.N. Doc. 
S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008) (renewing the authority of UN Security Council Resolution 
1816); S.C. Res. 1851, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008) (encouraging states to coor-
dinate their efforts in combating piracy); S.C. Res. 1897, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1987 (Nov. 30, 
2009) (renewing prior Chapter VII language for another 12 months).  
 15 Memorandum of Understanding U.S.-Kenya, supra note 8; Memorandum of Under-
standing U.K.-Kenya, supra note 8. 
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agree to conduct the investigations and prosecute the cases, using support 
and evidence from the U.S. or the U.K.16 Kenya was able to successfully 
prosecute a significant number of piracy cases,17 however, in 2010 the gov-
ernment formally announced its plan to stop prosecuting pirates unless other 
countries increased their burden of prosecutions, and to cancel its agree-
ments with their countries due to overcrowding in the Kenyan prison system 
and burdening of the criminal justice system.18 Nonetheless, the Kenyan 
government has continued to prosecute piracy cases,19 and as of June 2011, 
had 119 pirates in custody awaiting trial, and fifty convictions.20 The long-
term viability for Kenya to prosecute large numbers of additional pirates, 
however, remains very much in question.21 
The Republic of Seychelles signed a similar Exchange of Letters, 
but with the European Union, in August 2009, allowing the E.U. Naval 
Force (EUNAVFOR) to transfer to it pirates captured in Seychelles’ exclu-
sive economic zone, territorial sea, archipelagic waters and internal wa-
ters.22 In support of piracy prosecutions in both Kenya and the Seychelles, 
in May 2009, the U.N. Office of Drugs and Crime (UNODC)23 provided 
  
 16 Id. 
 17 Mike Pflanz, At Last, a Court to Try Somali Pirates, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (July 8, 
2010), http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0708/At-last-a-court-to-try-Somali-
pirates (noting that as of July 2010, the Kenyan government had convicted 18 pirates).  
 18 Seychelles to Set Up Courts to Fight Piracy: UN, STARAFRICA.COM (May 5, 2010), 
http://www.starafrica.com/en/news/detail-news/view/seychelles-to-set-up-courts-to-fight-pir-
46805.html (stating Kenya’s announcement that it may cancel agreements with several na-
tions to prosecute piracy suspects); Mohamed Yusuf, UNODC Praises Kenyan Anti-Piracy 
Actions, SOMALIA REPORT (Mar. 28, 2011), http://www.somaliareport.com/index.php/post/ 
407/UNODC_Praises_Kenyan_Anti-Piracy_Actions (reporting over-crowded prisons as a 
reason Kenya had ceased prosecuting piracy suspects); see also Abdi Muhumed Abdikarim, 
Questions over Anti-Piracy Court in Kenya, ALSHAHID (June 29, 2010), http://www.english. 
alshahid.net/archives/8328 (discussing Kenya’s burdens in the prosecution of piracy sus-
pects).  
 19 See Kenya Opens Fast-Track Piracy Court in Mombasa, BBC NEWS (June 24, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10401413 (reporting on-going efforts of the Kenya government 
to prosecute suspected pirates).  Kenya has not formally indicated whether or not this means 
they will follow through with the MOUs.  Id. (stating that although “negotiations are ongo-
ing,” suspected pirates would “get a fair trial in Kenya.”).    
 20 Somalia for Anti-Piracy Court Inside Country, supra note 6. 
 21 See TIFFANY BASCIANO, CONTEMPORARY PIRACY: CONSEQUENCES AND CURES 14 (2009) 
(discussing the views of legal experts from various corners regarding maritime policy in the 
Gulf of Aden and how to address Somali piracy).  
 22 Exchange of Letters, supra note 8. 
 23 See U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, Counter Piracy Programme, 2–3 (Nov. 2009), 
http://www.unodc.org/documents/easternafrica/piracy/UNODC_Counter_Piracy_Programme
.pdf, at 2–3 (describing the full range of UNODC’s efforts to enhance judicial capacity con-
sistent with U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851).  
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$2.3 million to cover 18 months.24 In July 2010, the Seychelles successfully 
completed their first piracy case, resulting in a ten year sentence for eleven 
pirates who tried to pirate and hijack the Topaz patrol boat.25 The Seychelles 
government has expressed concern about its capacity to imprison new con-
victs, and has passed a law facilitating transfers back to Somalia.26 Long-
term, given the size of the Seychelles judicial system, and its concerns over 
detention capacity, the capacity of the Seychelles to take on a large load of 
these cases is questionable.  
Similar to both Kenya and the Seychelles, the European Union and 
UNODC have recently looked to Mauritius for additional support for piracy 
prosecutions. In July 2011, Mauritius and the European Union entered into 
an agreement for the transfer of suspected pirates for investigation, prosecu-
tion, trial and detention in Mauritius.27 The agreement includes a new court 
and prison for these piracy cases, and the government must pass new legis-
lation.28 The Maldives are another possible forum for prosecuting piracy 
cases, and as of June 2011, had 34 pirates in detention awaiting trial.29 The 
UNODC Counter Piracy Programme as a whole aims to provide assistance 
to nations exercising universal jurisdiction to try Somali pirates captured off 
of the coast of Africa, in support of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1851 
by: providing funding (such as the funding provided to Kenya and the Sey-
chelles); training for police, judges and prosecutors; and improvements to 
prison systems (including refurbishments, health and educational services, 
and training for staff).30 While many states have resisted turning pirates over 
to Somalia, due to both capability and humane treatment concerns, 31 the 
UNODC Counter Piracy Program has been supporting transfer arrange-
ments from third countries prosecuting Somali nationals back to Somalia’s 
prison system so they can be closer to their homes and to alleviate the bur-
  
 24 David B. Rivkin Jr. & Carlos Ramos-Mrosovsky, A Better Way to Deal with Pirates, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 9, 2010, at A27 (discussing the UNODC’s efforts to counteract piracy in 
Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia).  
 25 Somali Pirates Sentenced to 10 Years in Seychelles, BBC NEWS AFRICA (July 26, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10763605 (presenting news of the conviction of 
eight Somali pirates for piracy and three others for aiding and abetting piracy for trying to 
hijack the Topaz patrol boat). 
 26 Id. 
 27 See generally Agreement Between the European Union and the Republic of Mauritius 
on the Conditions of Transfer of Suspected Pirates and Associated Seized Property from the 
European Union-led Naval Force to the Republic of Mauritius and on the Conditions of 
Suspected Pirates After Transfer, July 14, 2011, 2011 O.J. (L254). 
 28 Id. art 7. 
 29 Somalia for Anti-Piracy Court Inside Country, supra note 6. 
 30 U.N. Office on Drugs and Crime, supra note 23, at 4. 
 31 Id. at 9 
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den on third states.32 Beginning in 2010, UNODC began a Somaliland and 
Puntland prison program to help strengthen their capacity.33 While a contin-
uation of the various efforts to strengthen the domestic capacity of regional 
host nations will result in additional prosecutions, it is unlikely that these 
small countries with limited judicial and corrections capacity will be suffi-
cient to address the ever-growing numbers alone.  
III. EUROPEAN AND AMERICAN STATE PROSECUTIONS: THE UNITED 
STATES, NETHERLANDS AND GERMANY 
In addition to the various regional piracy prosecutions using univer-
sal jurisdiction (as incorporated into their domestic statutes), a few wealthier 
Western states have prosecuted piracy cases, primarily when they have been 
victimized. The first U.S. prosecution was against Abduwali Abjukhadir 
Muse for his role in the attack on the Maersk Alabama and taking its captain 
hostage in April 2009; marking the first time a pirate was in U.S. custody 
for an attack on an American.34 In May 2010, Muse pled guilty to the crimes 
of maritime hijackings, kidnappings and hostage-taking, but not to piracy 
itself.35 The second U.S. prosecution concluded on August 27, 2010, when 
six Somalis pled guilty to attacking a vessel, engaging in violence against 
persons on a vessel, and using a firearm during a crime of violence commit-
ted against the USS Ashland,36 after a judge had concluded that the crime of 
piracy could not take place unless there was a “robbery at sea.”37 A few 
months later, on November 24, 2010, the U.S. had its first jury conviction 
for the crime of piracy since 1820, when five Somali men were convicted of 
piracy and other crimes for their attack on the USS Nicholas.38 Piracy cases 
continued in 2011, with the ongoing prosecution of the surviving Somalis 
who pirated the Quest yacht, killing four Americans.39 To date, several have 
  
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 See Zain Verjee et al., Hostage Captain Rescued: Navy Snipers Kill 3 Pirates, CNN 
(Apr. 12, 2009), http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/04/12/somalia.pirates. 
 35 United States v. Abjuwali Abdukhadir Muse, supra note 9; Ray Rivera, Somali Man 
Pleads Guilty in 2009 Hijacking of Ship, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2010, at A21 (noting that the 
prosecutor dropped the piracy charge in exchange for a guilty plea). 
 36 United States v. Said, 757 F. Supp. 2d 554, 567 (E.D. Va. 2010); Guilty Plea in Ashland 
Piracy Case, MARINELOG (Aug. 30, 2010), http://www.marinelog.com/DOCS/NEWSMMIX 
/2010aug00302.html.  
 37 Guilty Plea in Ashland Piracy Case, supra note 36. 
 38 United States v. Hasan, 747 F. Supp. 2d 599 (E.D. Va. 2010); see also, U.S. Attorney’s 
Office, Eastern District of Virginia, Five Somalis Convicted of Piracy Against USS Nicholas, 
FBI (Nov. 24, 2010), http://www.fbi.gov/norfolk/press-releases/2010/nf112410.htm.  
 39 Two More Somalis Sentenced in Piracy Cases, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Oct. 4, 
2011), http://www.rnw.nl/africa/bulletin/two-more-somalis-sentenced-piracy-case.  
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pled guilty.40 While these cases were successfully prosecuted on U.S. soil, 
they were expensive,41 and demonstrated some challenges in applying the 
international law of piracy uniformly.  
In June 2010, the Dutch government became the first European 
country to try and convict a case involving Somali piracy; the victim was a 
Turkish-owned (not Dutch) freight ship named Samanyolu.42 Of note, the 
judge took into account the difficult living conditions in Somalia, in decid-
ing to sentence the pirates to only five years43 (at which point, presumably, 
they could be released on Dutch soil). The German government followed a 
few months later with its first modern-day piracy case involving ten Somalis 
who had hijacked the German-flagged MV Taipan cargo ship in April, 
2010.44 The maximum sentence available under German law for these pi-
rates, if convicted, is fifteen years for adults and ten years for juveniles.45 
Nearly a year into the trial, the case appears to still be underway.46  
While these European and American cases are helpful in moving pi-
racy prosecutions forward, they are generally reserved for cases when the 
state is a victim, and in the limited European experience so far, the sentenc-
es are light. In a few years time, pirates who have served out their sentences, 
or pirates who are acquitted of piracy charges may be eligible to claim asy-
lum on their soil. This may create a disincentive to large numbers of prose-
cutions that will only be exacerbated when the first pirate becomes a citizen 
of the state that agreed to prosecute him. Different legal conclusions regard-
ing the international law of piracy (e.g., the U.S. judge determination that 
piracy required “robbery at sea”), and different sentence ranges all compli-
cate the effort to increase the number of prosecutions.  
  
 40 Id. 
 41 The estimated cost of piracy trials and imprisonment in 2010 is around $31 million. 
OCEANS BEYOND PIRACY, THE ECONOMIC COST OF PIRACY 1 (2010), available at http:// 
oceansbeyondpiracy.org/sites/default/files/documents_old/The_Economic_Cost_of_Piracy_ 
Summary.pdf.  For information on the U.S. prosecutions, see generally Milena Sterio, 11 
Somali Pirates Brought to U.S. for Prosecution, THOUGHTS ON INT’L LAW & POL. BLOG (Apr. 
22, 2010, 6:27 PM), http://intlawandpolitics.blogspot.com/2010/04/11-somali-pirates-
brought-to-us-for.html. 
 42 Dutch Court Convicts Five Somalis of Piracy, TELEGRAPH (June 17, 2010), http://www. 
telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/piracy/7836714/Dutch-court-convicts-five-Somalis-of-
piracy.html  
 43 Id. (stating that the prosecutors were only seeking a sentence of seven years). 
 44 Schlicht, supra note 11.  
 45 Id. 
 46 Jan-Philipp Scholz, No end in Sight for Pirate Trial in Hamburg, DEUTSCHE WELLE 
(May 24, 2011), http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,15101199,00.html. 
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IV. THE JACK LANG REPORT: A SPECIALIZED COURT SYSTEM FOR PIRACY 
CASES 
As another step in addressing this growing surge in piracy cases, on 
August 25, 2010, the U.N. Secretary General commissioned Jack Lang, as 
his Special Advisor on legal issues related to piracy off the coast of Soma-
lia, to identify steps that could be taken to achieve and sustain results in 
piracy prosecutions.47 Six months later, Jack Lang submitted a report to the 
Secretary General, proposing the establishment of a specialized court sys-
tem to address piracy cases in two Somali jurisdictions—Somaliland and 
Puntland—with a separate temporary court in Arusha, Tanzania (using the 
facilities from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR)) to 
hear cases extraterritorially.48 The Puntland and Arusha specialized courts 
would have universal jurisdiction under the counter-piracy law, and the So-
maliland court will address acts committed by persons of Somaliland or in 
its territorial waters,49 with the aim of promoting consistency in piracy pros-
ecutions.50 The extraterritorial Arusha court would eventually move to 
Mogadishu when security permits.51  
These three specialized courts would use local judges and operate in 
the Somali language,52 but would require international support to create the 
legislative framework for the system and train judges on the new legisla-
tion.53 International funding would be provided on a voluntary basis, 
through a UNODC Trust Fund.54 The current cost estimates are about $25 
million over a period of three years, not including funding for international 
judges or lawyers who would come to help strengthen the capacity of the 
Somali courts, local judge salaries or court security.55 Jack Lang believes 
  
 47 U.N. Secretary-General, Letter dated Aug. 25, 2010 from the Secretary-General ad-
dressed to the President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/2010/451 (Aug. 25, 2010).  
 48 Jack Lang Report, supra note 2, at 38–39. 
 49 Id. at 39 (“Somaliland, on the other hand, has stated that it will only accept jurisdiction 
limited to acts committed by persons from Somaliland . . . or in its territorial waters . . . .”).  
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Id. at 40.  
 53 Id. at 39.  
 54 Jack Lang Report, supra note 2, at 43–45.  
Funding sources are limited to a few States and the European Union, which have 
directly enhanced the budget of several United Nations agencies and bodies, in-
cluding UNODC, and to States that have contributed to the trust fund created by 
the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia in January 2010. That fund is 
now a source of special funding intended to strengthen the judicial and correctional 
capacity of States in the region. 
Id. 
 55 Id. at 44.  
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that placing the extraterritorial court in Arusha, “Africa’s ‘legal capital,’” 
will help strengthen the rule of law in Somalia by attracting international 
legal experts who may not be able or willing to enter Somalia, and can lev-
erage the existing ICTR court site to save money.56 The proposal also in-
cludes construction of two new prisons in Puntland and Somaliland within 
two years, with the capacity of five hundred pirates each, to end the practice 
of “catch and release” that has been taking place in Somalia.57 These prisons 
would receive training from UNODC on corrections and be monitored by a 
surveillance committee outside of the prison for human rights concerns.58  
While there is significant merit in some aspects of the Jack Lang 
report, there are also a few drawbacks. First, historical experience gained 
through establishment of war crimes tribunals has demonstrated that there is 
often not the spillover effect for rule of law that we intend,59 as domestic 
tribunals often have international judges and/or local judges who do not go 
back to the regular court system, and “specialized” one-issue courts do not 
often integrate enough with the mainstream justice system to have the in-
tended benefit. Second, international lawyers and judges are very expensive, 
and could quickly become one of the most costly aspects of the endeavor.60 
Taken together, raising the $25 million (plus international lawyer and judge 
costs) through voluntary contributions will be difficult. Additionally, this 
sum is only projected to cover this three-year time period, and history shows 
that ad hoc tribunals never seem to end on time (thus requiring additional 
  
 56 Id. at 40. 
 57 Id. at 37. 
 58 Id. 
 59 See Nsongurua J. Udombana, Globalization of Justice and the Special Court for Sierra 
Leone’s War Crimes, 17 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 55, 86 (2003) (explaining the special court 
was comprised of international judges removed from the local court system); Ian M. Ralby, 
Joint Criminal Enterprise Liability in the Iraq High Tribunal, 28 B.U. INT’L L. J. 281, 283–
84 (2010) (explaining the Iraq High Tribunal used local judges but faced security challenges 
that likewise prevented some of the intended spillover effect).  
 60 These international lawyers condition their arrival upon certain due process standards 
being achieved in the court system, which are often not achievable without the international 
legal assistance in the first place. This can lead to a “chicken-and-egg” issue regarding 
whether you need the international lawyers to create a good system, or whether the interna-
tional lawyers will come to a system that is not yet good enough. The Iraq High Tribunal is a 
perfect example of a court that could not get adequate international lawyers from countries 
other than the U.S. due to concerns that their system had the death penalty and/or was not 
inherently fair. See generally John B. Bellinger III, Legal Adviser to the U.S. Sec’y of State, 
Speech on International Criminal Justice at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy (Nov. 
14, 2008), available at http://www.cfr.org/international-criminal-courts-and-tribunals/ 
bellingers-speech-international-criminal-justice/p17777 (arguing that the U.S. has stood 
alone in supporting the Iraq High Tribunal). 
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funding).61 Most importantly, to ensure its effectiveness, a specialized tribu-
nal would require the commitment of the senior Somali government to ad-
dress not only lower level piracy crimes, but also the “higher-ups,” who are 
fueling the continued rise in piracy. The Transitional Federal Government 
and regional authorities have expressed support for a court within Soma-
lia.62 Recent acts, however, including Somalia’s failure to pass a piracy law 
out of concern that it conflicted with Shari’a law,63 raise concerns about the 
government’s ability to do so. This latter aspect will be discussed more in 
depth below as part of the analysis of a viable model. 
V. ASSESSING A VIABLE MODEL FOR PROSECUTIONS OF SOMALI PIRATES 
The sheer volume and scale of ongoing pirate attacks off of Somalia 
demonstrates that prosecution efforts to date have not been effective at de-
terring this conduct. Accordingly, it is important to look at ways in which 
these prosecutions can be improved, and multiplied in a manner which re-
sults in more prosecutions, carried out in a relatively uniform way (similar 
sentences for similar crimes, etc.). Max Johns from the German Shipowners 
Association makes the argument for an international court by claiming, “It 
doesn’t make much sense to make lawyers and courts everywhere specialize 
in such a narrow subject in order to arrive at what could be very different 
verdicts.” 64 That said, consistent with the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC), which is based on the fundamental principle of na-
tional court complementarity, national courts are taking the frontline in in-
ternational criminal accountability.
 65
 For the purposes of the ICC (which 
  
 61 See Jason McClurg, Complications with the Sierra Leone War Crimes Court Raises 
Questions About Effectiveness of Future Ad Hoc Tribunals, 21 INT’L ENFORCEMENT L. REP. 
506, 506 (2005) (explaining the Special Court of Sierra Leone was established in 2002); 
Charles Chernor Jalloh, Special Court for Sierra Leone: Achieving Justice?, 32 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 395, 435 (2011) (explaining the Special Court of Sierra Leone had a limited three-
year mandate scheduled to end in 2005).   
 62 Margaret Besheer, Somalia Wants Piracy Courts on its Territory, VOICE OF AMERICA 
(June 21, 2011), http://www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/Somalia-Wants-Piracy-Courts 
-on-its-Territory-124298529.html.  
 63 Betwa Sharma, UN Adviser: Piracy Tribunals Needed ASAP, AOL NEWS (Jan. 25, 
2011), http://www.aolnews.com/2011/01/25/un-adviser-piracy-tribunals-needed-asap/. 
 64 Scholz, supra note 46. 
 65 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 
90 (providing that the ICC should be a court of last resort); see also OFFICE OF THE 
PROSECUTOR, PAPER ON SOME POLICY ISSUES BEFORE THE OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 4–5 
(2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/1FA7C4C6-DE5F-42B7-8B25-
60AA962ED8B6/143594/030905_Policy-Paper.pdf (describing the Office’s understanding 
of Article 17 of the Rome Statute); Sandra Hodgkinson, Are Ad Hoc Tribunals an Effective 
Tool for Prosecuting International Terrorism Case?, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 515, 521–22 
(exploring the growing preference for national courts in cases of war crimes and crimes of 
terrorism over ad hoc tribunals). 
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does not have jurisdiction over piracy cases, but other certain other interna-
tional crimes), this principle of complementarity has increased the expecta-
tion that, for these crimes at least, national courts should be capable of ad-
dressing them.66 Applying this principle to Somalia piracy cases would lead 
one to conclude that a Somalia which is willing and able to prosecute piracy 
cases effectively should do so. While it is broadly recognized that Somalia 
does not have this capacity at present, and until such time as it does, capaci-
ty-building efforts are helpful as long as the international community sup-
porting them can reasonably expect that the Somali government will be will-
ing politically to prosecute these cases when it is able. That is to say that the 
Somali government could prosecute piracy effectively as long as the benefi-
ciaries of pirate attacks and/or higher-ups in the piracy ranks67 are not close-
ly linked with the Somali government in such a way as to influence the ju-
dicial system and its ability to function effectively. On this latter issue, 
however, reasonable minds differ. 
In this context, it would be helpful to now examine Jack Lang’s 
proposal. Does it make sense to establish specialized courts in Somalia, with 
one extraterritorially? Some degree of capacity-building in Somalia, wheth-
er it is a specialized court, or enhanced training to the existing criminal jus-
tice system, makes sense if one believes that the Somali government will 
allow prosecutions of pirates go forward. Similarly, transfers of prisoners 
back to Somalia to serve out sentences adjudged in third countries also 
makes sense if you believe that the Somali government will honor these 
sentences and keep convicted pirates incarcerated. On these two latter 
points, there are differing views, and the lack of stability in Somalia brings 
greater uncertainty to either view.  
Assuming for the sake of argument that the Somali government can 
be trusted to faithfully carry out prosecutions and convictions reached for 
piracy cases if their capacity is strengthened, then it worth examining 
whether Jack Lang’s proposal to establish “specialized” courts is preferable 
to something more akin to enhanced training for the regular court system.68 
  
 66 William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International Criminal 
Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
53, 53–54 (2008); see also Hodgkinson, supra note 65, at 521 (noting the trend towards 
using national courts to prosecute international crimes).  
 67 According to the U.N., the Somalian pirate network consists of 10–20 financiers, 50 
main pirate leaders, 300 leaders of pirate attack groups, and approximately 2,500 lower level 
foot soldiers. Rep. of the Secretary-General, supra note 3. Some reports indicate that Somali 
officials have been complicit in acts of piracy. U.N. Secretary-General, Rep. of the Secretary-
General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1846 (2008), ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/2009/146 
(March 16, 2009) (noting reports of Puntland officials complicit in piracy, in particular the 
discharge of several Somali officials for such activities).  
 68 Press Release, Security Council, In Race Between Pirates and International Community, 
Pirates Clearly Winning, Secretary-General’s Top Legal Adviser on Piracy Warns Security 
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Given that piracy is one of many regular crimes that could be committed in 
Somalia,69 it might be worth examining the success of several African states 
to specifically train prosecutors, judges and other court personnel (for spe-
cialized “panels” versus “courts”) within the regular court system to address 
violence against women and children. South Africa is among countries who 
have specially trained judges and prosecutors to handle cases of violence 
against women and children, but they handle them within the regular court 
system rather than through a separately established court with singular ju-
risdiction.70 Following this example would support mainstreaming piracy 
prosecutions into the regular Somali court system using specially trained 
judges and prosecutors. By mainstreaming the enhanced capacity, it is more 
likely that you would attain the “spillover” effect to the regular justice sys-
tem so often being sought, even if and when piracy cases start to wind 
down. Furthermore, the cost of implementation in the regular courts would 
probably be significantly less than $25 million. This all tracks, if one be-
lieves that the Somali government is willing to take on these cases and see 
them through the entire justice process, including prison sentences. 
If one does not believe that the Somali government is willing to 
take on piracy cases, and in either event, until such time as they achieve the 
capacity to do so, other national courts remain a critical stopgap measure to 
ensuring that these cases continue to move forward. In this vein, efforts to 
strengthen other countries’ effectiveness are helpful through efforts such as 
the UNODC Counter Piracy Programme and U.N. Contact Group on Piracy 
are paramount and should be continued. While the capacity of any one re-
gional state, such as the Seychelles or Kenya, is limited, and the political 
will of other states with more capacity may be limited due to concerns over 
asylum71 and/or resources,72 continuing efforts to encourage all states to 
  
Council, U.N. Press Release SC/10164 (Jan. 25, 2011) (describing Lang’s proposal to estab-
lish two specialized courts in Puntland and Somaliland to try captured pirates).  
 69 Albeit of universal condemnation and accordingly universal jurisdiction. See At Sea: 
Piracy Off the Coast of Somalia is Getting Worse. Time to Act, ECONOMIST, Feb. 3, 2011, at 
16 (providing a detailed accounting of the pirate attacks in 2010 and the resulting financial 
and prisoner casualties). 
 70 Nicole Itano, S. Africa Finds ‘Rape Courts’ Work, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Jan. 29, 
2003), http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/0129/p01s04-woaf.html (discussing South Africa’s 
expansion of “rape courts” in order to reduce the wait time for trial). See generally 16 Days 
of No Violence Against Women Campaign, PARLIAMENT REPUBLIC S. AFRICA, http://www. 
parliament.gov.za/live/content.php?Item_ID=667 (last visited Nov. 10, 2011) (describing the 
international 16 Days of No Violence Against Women Campaign and South Africa’s addi-
tion of violence against children to their parallel version of the campaign). 
 71 Rivkin & Ramos-Mrosovsky, supra note 24. 
 72 States may be inclined to focus primarily on those cases in which their flagged-vessel or 
nationals are victimized. See Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Sec’y, Bureau of Political-
Military Affairs, Remarks to International Institute for Strategic Studies: U.S. Approaches to 
Counter-Piracy, U.S. DEP’T STATE (Mar. 30, 2011), available at http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ 
 
File: Hodgkinson 2 Created on: 4/3/2012 9:05:00 PM Last Printed: 4/18/2012 3:45:00 PM 
2011] THE BEST PROSECUTION MODEL 315 
prosecute acts of piracy is essential. In this regard, efforts to increase prose-
cutions and to ensure more uniform sentences and uniform application of 
the law are extremely helpful. The new U.N. Security Council resolution 
focuses efforts on the financiers (“higher-ups”) in the piracy organizations.73 
Focusing prosecutions on the “higher-ups,” who finance piracy and provide 
the equipment and training to the young, unemployed pirates, is essential to 
any effort to deter acts of piracy.  
Lastly, there are many who argue that prosecutions are not really 
the answer to the Somali piracy problem, and that stability in Somalia, and 
accordingly some prosperity, will alleviate the current piracy problem.74 It is 
hard to argue with the principle that a more stable Somalia would likely 
reduce the volume of pirate attacks. Conversely, however, given the number 
of ransoms being paid, and the amount, piracy is likely becoming a key part 
of the local economy when compared with other prospects for future em-
ployment, and deterring the conduct through prosecutions will be difficult. 
Furthermore, while Somali piracy may be unique to this region and linked 
to local instability, acts of piracy in West Africa, the South China Sea, and 
elsewhere, continue. Solutions which are more portable in nature—such as 
strengthening laws and capacity on a more global scale—may be preferable 
to investing large amounts of money in a specialized court for Somalia 
alone.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Piracy is still probably the most lucrative business in Somalia,
75
 and 
the percentage of pirates who are convicted of a crime is still relatively 
small. Any effort to strengthen the capacity of nations who will bring pirates 
to justice is helpful, whether it be through assisting them with domestic leg-
  
rls/rm/159419.htm (discussing piracy and the inability of many countries affected by piracy 
to prosecute piracy cases due to lack of capacity and/or political will). 
 73 UN Security Council Resolution Adopts India Co-Sponsored Response on Piracy, supra 
note 7. 
 74 See Michael Shank, Poverty, Political Instability and Somali Piracy: Letter Response to 
Financial Times Editorial on Piracy, E. AFRICA FORUM  (Nov. 14, 2008), http://www.east 
africaforum.net/2008/11/17/poverty-political-instability-and-somali-piracy. One scholar 
noted that throughout history, nothing was “so inimical to piracy as settled peace and good 
government,” and “nothing [was] so encouraging to piracy as prolonged unsettlement in 
international affairs and weak administration.” Sandra L Hodgkinson, Kevin Kelly et al., 
Piracy: New Efforts in Addressing this Enduring Problem, 36 TULANE MARITIME L. J. 65 
(2011) (citing E. KEBLE CHATTERTON, THE ROMANCE OF PIRACY: THE STORY OF THE 
ADVENTURES, FIGHTS & DEEDS OF DARING PARTIES, FILIBUSTERS & BUCCANEERS FROM THE 
EARLIEST TIMES TO THE PRESENT DAY 22 (1914)).  
 75 Ransoms increased from an average of approximately $150,000 in 2005 to an average 
of $5.4 million in 2010, bringing the 2010 total for ransoms to $238 million. OCEANS 
BEYOND PIRACY, supra note 41. 
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islation, training or courtroom and prison capacity. Since these programs 
will often dovetail other efforts to strengthen the rule of law, there may be 
an unintended benefit to the assistance, particularly if the capacity-building 
effort is not limited to a standalone piracy court. These capacity-building 
efforts should be coupled with efforts to make penalties more uniform, and 
efforts to ensure that prosecutions are focused primarily at higher-ups in the 
organizations.  
Some version of a “specialized” court in Somalia can be helpful if 
the international community believes that the Somali government will sup-
port the outcome. This author, however, would encourage a model more 
akin to a specialized “panel” within the regular court system than a separate, 
specialized “court,” for the reasons stated above. Until we begin to get 
ahead of the crime of piracy, the more prosecutions, and available fora, the 
better.  
 
